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Sovereignty is a concept that became generally accepted in western Europe 
around the middle of the 17th century. The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 is a 
convenient date to mark this occurrence. States with central power and direction 
had emerged out of the decentralized and somewhat chaotic organizations of 
medieval times, and they waged wars against each other as well as with assorted 
brigands, maurauders, and outlaws. By 1648, they had virtually exhausted them-
selves and had also devastated Europe, primarily as the result of all-out religious 
conflicts culminating in the Thirty Years War. They decided to accept some 
rules, and in a way that decision was meant to close and to fix the community of 
states and to preserve the status quo.2 
According to what we sometimes call the Westphalian system, each state in 
existence was legitimate, sovereign and independent. It was a member of the 
international community. It had the right to rule itself without outside inter-
ference and the right to wage war as a monopoly. Only states could engage in 
war, and to do so they used their regular military forces which fought other 
armed forces. Non-combatants were excluded. Anyone outside the regular 
armed forces who engaged in war was a bandit and a criminal. The concept of 
sovereignty has generally been in effect and respected ever since. Free and 
independent states have made alliances, conducted diplomacy, and waged war, 
the latter for territorial, dynastic, or commercial reasons, for maintaining a 
balance of power, and sometimes for survival. 
There have been exceptions. For example, in the latter part of the 19th 
century, the plight of the Cubans, subjects of Spain, was a factor in inducing the 
United States to go to war against Spain. That, in Westphalian terms, was a 
breach of Spanish sovereignty. On the other hand, before World War II, the 
plight of the Jews in Nazi Germany was, again in terms of the Westphalian 
system, of no concern to other national states, and they refrained from interfer-
ing with the internal affairs of the legitimate German government. Today Amer-
icans and western Europeans protest against the abuse of human rights in the 
Soviet Union and elsewhere. People all over the world demonstrate against 
apartheid in South Africa. The idea that a state can conduct its internal affairs 
without reference to other powers seems to be diminishing. 
The concept of sovereignty has been eroding also in its insistence that only 
states can make war. The Spanish guerrillas who harassed Napoleon's French 
forces of occupation early in the 19th century were breaking with tradition. They 
had no legal status in Westphalian terms. So too the French partisans who oper-
ated against the Prussian armies three-quarters of a century later. The Prussian 
troops were a legitimate instrument of the state, and they regarded the French 
irregulars as criminals. And so they were, according to the then conventions of 
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war.' But today, many people are prepared to argue on behalf of the legitimacy 
of non-state violence. The climate of opinion on both subjects — sovereignty 
and the right of non-state actors to bear arms — was one of the many things that 
World War II changed. 
Thirty-five years have passed since World War II came to an end. Since then, 
and even before the war was in progress, historians, journalists, and other 
observers examined and studied the upheaval, how it started and unfolded, the 
political and social dislocations it engendered, the changes it accelerated or 
created. World War II was, at least to this point, the greatest single event of the 
20th century. It engaged, involved, concerned, and touched in some way or 
another the entire population of the globe, some individuals and societies direct-
ly, others indirectly and often in delayed fashion. In terms of exertion, the 
belligerents made an unprecedented mobilization of human and economic re-
sources for a passionate and total effort. Millions of persons were killed and 
injured and irreparably harmed in other ways, while the destruction of property 
cannot be measured or even estimated with any degree of precision. 
The Second World War was a total war among nations. Yet, it was also a 
revolutionary war involving a clash of ideologies, a struggle between systems, a 
contest between different ways of ordering human lives. The conflict trans-
formed the international community, altered social structures, redrew political 
alignments, reshaped the centers of power, spurred technological development, 
and influenced habits, perceptions, values, and ideas. 
While the major belligerents marshalled all their resources to win the war and 
thereby to restore or reshape the balance of power, partisans, irregulars, and 
guerrilla warriors had different notions. In metropolitan France and in Yugo-
slavia, World War II was primarily a civil war. What was at stake was the kind 
of government to emerge at the end — monarchy, democratic republic, socialist 
or communist state. Overseas, where Britain and France fought to retain their 
empires, many of the local combatants struggled on behalf of ideals of social 
justice, in order to change the social and political order, or to gain eventual 
independence and sovereignty. These resistance movements and the violence 
they employed were extra-legal. The resistance groups claimed legitimacy on 
one ground or another, for example, by representing a government in exile. In 
the end, some gained legitimacy by virtue of the allied victory. But their wartime 
actions loosened the bonds of the Westphalian state system. 
The war brought to an end an historical age and signalled the arrival of a new 
period characterized by the advent of nuclear weapons. This represented a true 
historical discontinuity. Nuclear weapons were too destructive, so much so that 
they threatened to obliterate all life on earth. Total war for the purpose of total 
destruction in the hope of gaining total victory became, in the nuclear age, 
absurd and outmoded. 
Out of World War II emerged still another new condition, the Cold War. The 
final Allied victory settled some problems but brought no period of postwar 
peace. Instead, a new confrontation appeared, the bi-polar hostility of neither 
peace nor war. The essential characteristics of the Cold War, I suggest, were the 
emergence of two super-powers — a new balance of power — in rivalry through-
out the globe, exacerbated differences in ideology, and the possession of nuclear 
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weapons by both sides. The Communist victory in China and the detonation of 
an atomic device in Russia, both occurring in 1949, made for new international 
tensions and a succession of crises. Everyone dreaded that the friction might 
lead to angry nuclear explosions. 
The Korean War, which broke out the following year, was of quite a different 
character. It was a rational war where the means were closely controlled for 
limited political ends, at least for the United States and Red China. These ends 
were far less important than survival. The stakes were limited, and so were the 
expectations and expenditures. Throughout, the political leaders exerted tight 
control over the military commanders. The Americans dropped no nuclear 
bombs on the Chinese, and the Chinese dropped no bombs on Japan. Starting 
without a declaration of war, the Korean War never ended with a treaty of 
peace. An armistice in effect since 1953 provides an uneasy and an unstable kind 
of peace. Incidents and crises still take place along the border roughly across the 
middle of the Korean peninsula, and in this form the war continues. The 
confrontation between hostile powers remains low key. 
It can be argued that the war settled nothing. There is neither peace nor equi-
librium, and a resumption of the fighting can flare up at any moment. Why then 
did the fighting subside? Because, I believe, both sides were buying time for 
survival. Neither side wished to escalate the conflict into World War III. 
General MacArthur opposed that policy and said that there was no substitute 
for victory.4 But the fact is, both sides could perceive and could claim victory. 
The same perception, I think, lies behind the present peace between Egypt and 
Israel. Both sides in their last war could claim a victory of sorts. 
The war in Vietnam was different again. It was a war over the rise of nation-
alism and the break-up of old colonial empires. Nationalism, self-determina-
tion, and other such terms — wars of national liberation according to the 
Marxists — motivated bloodshed. But for the older powers wars to preserve 
empire or democracy or whatever, for both France and the United States in the 
case of Vietnam, the struggles had to be limited exertions, very tightly controlled 
to avoid a total World War III.5 
The new nature of politics and warfare, I believe, revolves about the necessity 
for states to limit violence. The politics of deterrence and of mutually assured 
destruction seek to insure against an outbreak of violence too horrible to con-
template. What makes it difficult for states or nations to maintain a reasonable 
balance of power in the world is the erosion of the Westphalian system. The 
concept of sovereign states, independent and free to pursue their own internal 
and external policies, has come under attack in a variety of ways: by inter-
national organizations that restrict sovereignty, by emphasis on human rights 
across national borders, by the rise of extra-legal groups engaging in warfare 
and challenging the community of states and its former monopoly for war. 
Campaigns of violence, sabotage, ambush, random assassination, and terror — 
are they committed by outlaws and criminals? No, according to some observers, 
not when they are politically motivated. The implicit legitimacy accorded to 
their aspirations has further eroded the Westphalian world. 
Today a variety of groups lacking status in the Westphalian sense challenges 
the monopoly of the state to wage war. Northern Ireland and the Middle East 
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are only two areas where non-state entities engage in warfare. The distinction 
between combatant and non-combatant has largely vanished, not only because 
of the means of destruction but also because of the new forms of warfare. 
German Big Bertha guns threw shells into Paris in World War I and damaged 
several churches, killing and injuring worshippers at prayer, and the act was 
regarded as an outrage. So too the zeppelins that dropped bombs into London 
and killed and injured people indiscriminately. 
But these are minor incidents when compared to the non-selective weapons in 
World War II. The ruthless acceleration of technology drew everyone into the 
war, as participant and potential victim. Strategic bombing made no pretense of 
distinguishing between legitimate targets and innocent children. The rationale 
for waging this kind of war was to break the enemy will to resist, to persuade the 
people to make their government surrender. It was a war against people. So too 
are random acts of violence by terrorists. 
Forced programs of research and development since World War II have 
brought a dazzling array of innovations to the technology of war. I refer not 
only to nuclear weapons but to conventional devices. As John Keegan, in his 
brilliant book The Face of Battle'' suggests, expectations of survival on the 
battlefield have declined over the centuries and drastically so in recent times. It 
used to be that a well-trained soldier went into battle with the belief that he 
would survive. If he could outmaneuver and outshoot his opponent, he had a 
good chance of living. Today the combat soldier begins to doubt it. The 
machines are too good, too destructive. As Keegan says, the battlefield may 
have abolished itself because it has become altogether too dangerous.7 
What has happened, of course, is that new battlefields have been found. 
Perhaps in some intuitive and unconscious way, man has invented newer forms 
of warfare in order to outwit weapons, in order to restore the human dimension 
to armed conflict. 
The secular religion of patriotism in support of nations seems to be giving way 
to a resurgence of cultural and religious values. The rise of Islam as a political 
force transcends national borders. We used to think that the old and terrible 
wars of religion belonged to the past. They are still with us. Old problems 
persist, newer forms to deal with them arise. 
The age of total warfare, I hope, has passed. When guerrilla warfare and 
terrorism seem to be on the increase and the state and its traditional military 
forces seem to be losing their control of the monopoly of waging war, victory 
and defeat may have become meaningless. Victory in the traditional sense, that 
is, achieved by military means, may have become ephemeral. Economic warfare 
may be much more powerful and much more efficacious than the traditional use 
of force in solving international problems. Those who shape and carry out inter-
national policy may have relegated the military to a lesser place in the spectrum 
of options on how to gain national goals. 
For the use of force in the old-fashioned or total way has become so 
dangerous as to be virtually unusable. Force, whether in being or in use, is now 
incontestably tied to diplomacy, and diplomacy is an ongoing struggle to 
manage grave problems of international politics in a highly dangerous and 
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inflammable world. A resort to armed force is probable now only when minor 
issues are at stake. 
We live in a world of 150 or so separate and autonomous national states, each 
struggling for advantage over the others, each recognizing no authority greater 
than its own. Severed diplomatic relations, economic sanctions, ultimatums, 
and force itself are still options open to nations that struggle to preserve and 
enhance their own positions. Since World War II, the world has spent three 
trillion dollars in armaments so that states will have armies, navies, air forces 
and reserve components that will contribute to national power, prestige, and 
influence. This is the world of the nation-state and of power politics. 
Beside it exists a newer world coming into existence or already in being. 
Nuclear weapons discourage the use of force, and there is neither strategy nor 
defense as we once knew them. In addition, groups outside the Westphalian 
frame of reference challenge through other forms of warfare the traditional 
ways of maintaining international order. 
We are, I believe, in a time of transition, where new rules on how to govern 
the affairs of mankind are emerging and being established. We lack the perspec-
tive to see clearly what is happening. But to me, it appears to be a new and 
rather different ballgame, far removed from the conditions of World War II. 
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